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ANNUITIES RIGHT OF LEGATEE, FOR WHOSE BENEFIT THE
PURCHASE OF AN ANNUITY IS DIRECTED, TO RECEIVE THE PRINCIPAL
IN LIEU THEREOF - T h e rule has become well established in England
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that, where a testator bequeaths an annuity for life to his beneficiary
and directs his executor or trustee to purchase the annuity with assets
of the estate, the annuitant 1 has an option to demand the purchase
money in lieu of the annuity. 2 The direction to purchase the annuity
is clothed by the courts with a power to change the mere gift of an annuity into a gift in the alternative of the principal or the annuity. This
direction indicates the will of the testator that a fund representing the
principal of the annuity should be severed completely from the bulk
of his estate and devoted to the sole benefit of. the annuitant. 8 As a
consequence of such severance the fund is considered to be wholly
within the control of the legatee. The result follows with equal precision whether testator gives a definite sum of money to his executor
and directs him to devote it to an annuity of such amount as may be
bought therewith,4 or directs the executor to purchase an annuity of
stipulated amount and to use such money as will be required. 11 Although
the problem has been squarely presented to the American courts on but
few occasions, those occasions have resulted in the adoption of the
English rule without hesitation or comment. 0 In view, however, of
the comparative originality of the problem in American jurisdictions,
it would appear worthwhile to question whether the English rule
should be further followed in this country.
One of the principal arguments upon which the rule finds support
is based upon the alienability of annuities. In Barnes v. Rowley,1 the
earliest authority for the annuitant's right of election, the court ex1 The annuitant must be sui juris in order to exercise his election. It is, of course,
required that the annuitant have sole and absolute interest in the annuity. Grove's
Trusts, 1 Giff. 74, 65 Eng. Rep. 831 (1859); Wright v. Callender, 2 De G. M. & G.
652, 42 Eng. Rep. 1027 (1852); 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 979 (19n).
2 In re Branning, [ l 909] l Ch. 2 76; In re Robbins, [ l 906] 2 Ch. 648; In re
Mabbett, [1891] 1 Ch. 707; Wakeham v. Merrick, 37 L. J. Ch. 45 (1867); In·re
Browne's Will, 27 Beav. 324, 54 Eng. Rep. 127 (1859); Ford v. Batley, 17 Beav.
303, 51 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1853); 2 ]ARMAN, W1LLs, 7th ed., l 109 (1930).
8 In re Oakley's Estate, 142 Misc. 1, 254 N. Y. S. 306 (1931); In re Proctor's
Will, 235 App. Div. 6, 255 N. Y. S, 722 (1932); In re Adriance's Estate, 158 Misc.
857, 286 N. Y. S. 936 (1936).
4 Barnes v. Rowley, 3 Ves. Jun. 305, 30 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797).
5 Ford v."Batley, 17 Beav. 303, 51 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1853),
t1 Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N. E. 476 (1911); Reid v. Brown, 54
Misc. 481, 106 N. Y. S. 27 (1907); Estate of Cole, 219 N. Y. 435, 114 N. E. 785
(1916); In re Bertuch's Will, 225 App. Div. 773, 232 N. Y. S. 36 (1928); 29 CoL.
L. REV. 370 (1929).
7 3 Ves. Jun. 305, 30 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797). The earlier case of Yates v.
Compton, 2 P. Wms. 309, 24 Eng. Rep. 743 (1725), is frequently cited in support
of annuitant's right of election; but in that case annuitant was also residuary legatee and
so her estate would have received the principal in any event, and it is probable that the
real issue involved an aspect of the doctrine of equitable conversion.
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plained that the annuitant's power to sell the annuity after it has been
purchased for him renders it wholly useless for the court to require the
annuitant to accept the annuity if he would prefer its purchase price.
This same explanation is repeated without discussion in the other early
English cases, and Barnes v. Rowley is cited as conclusive on the sub-.
ject.8 Nor could a testator circumvent the rule by stipulating that the
annuity should not be alienable; the courts simply dismissed the stipulation as ineffective. 9 Long before the annuity cases came before the
English courts it had been established that, where a testator directed his
executor to sell specific property and turn over the proceeds to a legatee,
the legatee had a right to demand the specific property if he so desired;
· or, if a testator bequeathed a sum of money to his executor with a
direction to purchase certain property and turn over such property to a
legatee, the legatee might elect to receive the money in lieu of the
property.10 This class of cases rested upon the futility of requiring an
ex~cution of the conversion against the wishes of the beneficiary; the
futility was explained by the alienability of the property as soon as it
should reach the hands of the beneficiary._ Thus, if a testator directed
his executor to sell certain land and turn over the proceeds to the beneficiary, the beneficiary may buy in the land himself and immediately
receive back as proceeds the purchase price.he has paid; if a testator
directed his executor to utilize a certain fund to buy land for the beneficiary, the beneficiary may sell the larid immediately after he receives
it and there will be no reason why he should not realize the sum set
aside by testator, for the land will presumably be worth the price for
which it was so recently purchased. It is difficult to raise any objection
to the election in this cla~s of cases, and the legatee's power of alienation is a sound argument for the result. It is possible that the English
courts assumed that the cases involving annuities were but members
of the same class and presented merely another aspect of the same
problem. The English cases contain no express reference to such an
approach, nor are cases of the type mentioned cited in support of the
8 Bayley v. Bishop, 9 Ves. Jun. 6, 32 Eng. Rep. 501 (1803); Palmer v. Craufurd,
,
3 Swans. 483, 36 Eng. Rep. 945 (1819); Dawson v. Hearn, I Russ. & M. 606, 39
Eng. Rep. 232 (1831); Ford v. Batley, 17 Beav. 303, 51 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1853).
9 Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197, 39 Eng. Rep. 370 (1831); Brown v.
Pocock, 2 Russ. & M. 210, 39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1833). The same argument is made
here as in the case of disabling restraints upon the alienability of land, viz., the restraint
is repugnant to the absolute interest given.
10 Benson v. Benson, 1 P. Wms. 130, 24 Eng. Rep. 324 (1710); Seeley v. Jago,
I P. Wms. 389, 24 Eng. Rep. 438 (1717); Attorney-General v. Weymouth, I Amb.
20, 27 Eng. Rep. II (1743); Seamer v. Bingham, 3 Atk. 54, 26 Eng. Rep. 834
(1743). These are early cases in the development of the doctrine of equitable conversion and reconversion. See annotation at 130 A. L. R. 1379 (1941).
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annuity doctrine; however, Parker v. Cobe,11 the leading American
case, hints at a similarity between the two situations. Whether or not
the English doctrine relating to· an annuitant's right of election was ·
derived from the already established doctrine of equitable reconversion,
the dissimilarity between the two types of case makes manifest the fallacy of basing an annuitant's right of election upon the power of the
annuitant to sell or assign his annuity.
The fundamental assumption of the rule allowing a legatee to elect
between a specific article and the fund set aside for its purchase is that
the article may be sold by the legatee for a sum equal to its purchase
price.. But such an assumption should not be made when the article to
be bought is an annuity. The annuitant will be able to sell his annuity
only at a price considerably less than the principal. It is extremely unlikely that the annuitant will find a purchaser who will bear the risk
of the annuitant's death before the period of his life expectancy is
completed for the same price that an annuity company will bear the
risk of the annuitant outliving his normal life expectancy. The purchaser will protect himself by buying at a discount because he cannot
protect himself by utilization of the law of averages. The annuity, unlike other articles, will terminate at the death of the annuitant; 12 this
introduces an element of uncertainty which must reflect in its market
value. It is extremely doubtful that purchasers would be willing to
invest in this type of property without a substantial reduction from the
original purchase price even if this element of uncertainty were not
present.If alienation will not realize a sum equal to the principal of
the annuity, how can the power of alienation be an adequate reason for
allowing the annuitant to receive the principal? Further, the necessity of a sacrifice sale will operate to some extent as an inherent restraint
upon the alienability of the annuity. It is not correct to allow an annuitant to receive the principal for the sole reason that he might accomplish the result by his own action if the election were to be denied.
11 208 Mass. 290, 94 N. E. 476 (1911). This case also tries to bring the annuity
question within a general doctrine respecting a bequest of an absolute legacy accompanied by an admonition that legatee use it for a particular specified purpose. It is
difficult to see the similarity between such a case and the annuity problem; the English
cases never used such an approach.
12 It is possible to create a perpetual annuity as well as an annuity for life, but
the creation of a perpetual annuity requires explicit evidence that such is the creator's
intent. It seems proper to construe the gift of a perpetual annuity as a gift of the
principal. But the English cases have arrived at the conclusion that bequest of an
annuity accompanied by direction that the annuity be purchased out of the estate is
a perpetual annuity because the annuitant has the right to receive the principal. Kerr v.
Middlesex Hospital, 2 De G. M. & G. 576, 42 Eng. Rep. 996 (1852). It is circular,
therefore, to explain the annuitant's election by saying that he was given a perpetual
annuity. In the question under consideration testator has expressly directed purchase of
an annuity for life.
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A more fundamental argument for the English rule of election is
adduced from the annuitant's sole and absolute ownership of the annuity. If the annuitant is the only person interested in the legacy, who
has a right to object if he wishes to take the principal dedicated to his
welfare rather than the annuity? There is no such person other than
himself: there is no other legatee owning an interest in the principal;
the executor can derive no benefit if the right of ~lection be denied; and
the estate of the testator will be diminished to the extent of the principal whether an annuity is bought or the principal is given to the annuitant. But can it be doubted that the intention of the testator is completely disregarded if his gift becomes a gift of the principal in place
of a gift of an annuity? The English cases make it quite clear that the
testator's intention is not material by declaring void an express stipulation by the testator that his beneficiary shall have no right to receive
the principal in lieu of the annuity.18 The frustration of testator's intent
is strikingly illustrated by those cases in which the annuitant dies before the annuity has been purchased. In such event the principal is
awarded to the annuitant's estate on the theory that his legacy really
amounted to a gift of the principal.14 From that starting point it is only
· necessary to apply the law relative to any legacy which has vested in
interest before the death of the legatee. It is not even required that the
annuitant should survive the time when the annuity was directed to be
bought.15 In justification of this result it could be argued that the
annuitant's personal incompetencies no longer constitute a barrier to
outright payment of the principal, but would it not be more in accord
with testator's intention to declare the legacy failed and permit the
13 Stokes v. Cheek, 28 Beav. 620, 54 Eng. Rep. 504 (1860); In re Nunn's
Trusts, L. R. 19 Eq. 331 (1875). But testator may prevent an election by annuitant
where he imposes forfeiture of the annuity with gift over to third persons in the event
of alienation by the annuitant. Power v. Hayne, L. R. 8 Eq. 262 (1869); Hatton v.
May, 3 Ch. D. 148 (1876); In re Draper, 57 L. J. Ch. 942 (1888); 33 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 979 ( l 9 II). Two reasons are given for recognition of this type of restraint:
first, the intent of testator that annuitant shall not receive the principal if manifest, and,
second, the principal must be withheld if the executor is to be able to pay over to a
third person on happening of the event.
14 Barnes v. Rowley, 3 Ves. Jun. 305, 30 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797); Bayley v.
Bishop, 9 Ves. Jun. 6, 32 Eng. Rep. 501 (1803); Palmer v. Craufurd, 3 Swans.
483, 36 Eng. Rep. 945 (1819); Dawson v. Hearn, l Russ. & M.· 606, 39 Eng. Rep.
232 (1831); In re Robbins, [1906] 2 Ch. 648; In re Brunning, [1909] 1 Ch. 276.
It would seem debatable whether annuitant has a right of election because the direction
to purchase constitutes an outright legacy of the principal, or whether the direction to
purchase constitutes an outright legacy of the principal because annuitant has the right
of election. As far as historical development reveals, the early cases (such as Barnes
v. Rowley) found an outright legacy of the principal on the ground that annuitant
had an election; and the later cases (such as Ford v. Batley) supported the right of
election by citation of Barnes v. Rowley, etc.
15 In re Robbins, [ I 906] 2 Ch: 648.
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principal to fall back into his owri estate? 16 The legacy must have been
intended as a gift personal to the annuitant or an annuity limited to
his life would not have been prescribed. Further, if an anuity has been
bought in fact, no part of the principal would be due the annuitant's
estate at death.
This disregard of testator's intention is consistent with the general
trend of English law. The broad policy of English law is to give complete power and control over property to the person who owns the sole
and absolute interest therein. This policy is illustrated by the doctrine
which permits a cestui que trust to terminate the trust without regard
to the intention of the testator. 17 But the American courts, before the
annuity cases were first encountered, had adopted a contrary policy,
the policy of allowing a testator to make such disposition of his property as he wished and lending the aid of the courts to enforcement of
the disposition after it has been made. As established by the leading
case of Claflin v. Claflin,1 8 the fact that a beneficiary held an absolute
and sole interest was not sufficient to defeat the intent of the testator.
Having established such a policy, it becomes difficult to explain why the
American courts retreated in the annuity case. As Professor Scott says,
"It is, however, more remarkable that the American courts should disregard the intention of the testator." 19 The Massachusetts court did
recognize the existence of such a doctrine when it decided Parker v.
Cobe,2° but dismissed it with the words: "The case at bar is not a case
where $75,000 was left upon the trust that the income of it should be
paid to Ruth H. Cabe during her life, but it is a case where the ·$75,000
was to be laid out by the trustees in the purchase of an annuity for
Ruth H. Cabe during her life. For that reason it is not a case within
the rule of Claflin v. Claflin . . . ." Now, it may be true that the
Claflin doctrine only extends to a trust in the technical sense, but if the
Claflin doctrine is an expression of a general policy to effectuate the
intention of the testator wherever possible there is no reason to restrict
the policy to cases involving a technical trust. In substantial effect a
16 Any arrears in annuity payments which have accrued should, nevertheless, be
paid into the annuitant's estate. In those cases where the estate proves insufficient to pay
all legacies and annuities, the annuity will abate proportionately with the other legacies.
In such a case there is justification for payment of the principal to the annuitant rather
than requiring purchase of an annuity with the remaining capital; testator's plan of disposition has been thwarted anyway, and the court cannot carry out his exact intention.
Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Barnett, 114 N. J. Eq. 4, 168 A. 173 (1933).
17 Josselyn v. Josselyn, 9 Sim. 63, 59 Eng. Rep. 281 (1837); Saunders v. Vautier,
4 Beav. II5, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841).
18 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889). See 3 ScoTT, TRusTS, § 337.3 ff.
(1939).
19 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 346, pp. 1898-1899 (1939).
20 208 Mass. 260 at 263, 94 N. E. 476 (19u).
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gift of an annuity· for life will work out in a manner similar to a trust
for the payment of income if the annuitant is not permitted to disrupt
the testator's plan by taking the principal in lieu of the annuity. It is
certainly no answer to say that testator could have created a technical
trust if he wanted to prevent the annuitant from taking the principal;
nor is it an answer to say that'testator must have intended a gift of the
principal inasmuch as he is presumed to know that the law will give the
annuitant a right to elect to receive the principal. 21
It is to be hoped that American courts in the future will examine
the annuity problem more critically and will not be content with mere
citation of Parker v. Cabe, Estate of Cole, and the English cases. If the
annuity case calls for application of a policy different from that underlying the Claflin doctrine, perhaps the reason therefor will be explained
in the future. But, in New York at least, the inconsistency of the annuity doctrine has been recognized and acted upon by the legislature.22
The annuity presents a very simple method whereby a testator, without
use of the more complicated and expensive trust device, may insure the
future welfare of his beneficiary and also eliminate anxieties aroused by
his beneficiary's facility in disposing of property. Its usefulness should
not be impaired without a substantial reason for so doing.
Raymond R. JJ-llen*

21 Reid v. Brown, 54 Misc. 481, 106 N. Y. S. 27 (1907); Estate of Cole, 219
N. Y. 435, II4 N. E. 785 (1916).
.
22 13 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1942), "Decedent Estate Law,"
§ 47~b: "If a person hereafter dying shalf airect in his will the purchase of an annuity,
the person or persons to whom the income thereof shall be directed to be paid shall
not have the right to elect to take the capital sum directed to be used for such purchase
in lieu of such annuity except to the extent the will expressly provides for such right,
or except to the extent that the will expressly provides that an assignable annuity be
purchased." See In re Geis' Estate, 167 Misc. 357, 3 N. Y. S. (2d} 770 (1938), and
In re Fischer's Estate, 261 App. Div. 252, 25 N. Y. S. (2d} 140 (1941); both of these
cases were decided prior to the effectiveness of the I 941 amendment to the statute.
* Law Schop!, University of Michigan.-Ed.

